Extracts from Plato's Republic - The Myth of the Cave

 For talk in Athens - Thursday 23rd March - 2023

 

Extracts of Plato’s Cave:

(Plato’s Book Republic – 514a to 517a)

Translated by:  Waterfield, Robin. Republic (Oxford World's Classics) OUP Oxford. Kindle Edition.

The Prisoner Ascends from the Cave   (Plato’s Republic – 514a to 517a)

514a ‘Next,’ I said, ‘here’s a situation which you can use as an analogy for the human condition—for our education or lack of it. Imagine people living in a cavernous cell down under the ground; at the far end of the cave, a long way off, there’s an entrance open to the outside world. They’ve been there since childhood, with their legs and necks tied up in a way which keeps them in one place and allows them to look only straight ahead, but not to turn their heads. There’s firelight burning a long way further up the cave behind them, and up the slope between the fire and the prisoners there’s a road, beside which you should imagine a low wall has been built—like the partition which conjurors place between themselves and their audience and above which they show their tricks.’ B

‘All right,’ he said.

‘Imagine also that there are people on the other side of this wall who are carrying all sorts of artefacts. These artefacts, human statuettes, and animal models carved in stone and wood and all kinds of materials stick out over the wall; and as you’d expect, some of the people talk as they carry these objects along, while others are silent.’ c

515a

‘This is a strange picture you’re painting,’ he said, ‘with strange prisoners.’

‘They’re no different from us,’ I said. ‘I mean, in the first place, do you think they’d see anything of themselves and one another except the shadows cast by the fire on to the cave wall directly opposite them?’

‘Of course not,’ he said. ‘They’re forced to spend their lives without moving their heads.’ ‘And what about the objects which were being carried along? Won’t they only see their shadows as well?’ b

‘Naturally.’ ‘Now, suppose they were able to talk to one another: don’t you think they’d assume that their words applied to what they saw passing by in front of them?

‘They couldn’t think otherwise.’

“And what if sound echoed off the prison wall opposite them? When any of the passers-by spoke, don’t you think they’d be bound to assume that the sound came from a passing shadow?’

‘I’m absolutely certain of it,’ he said.

‘All in all, then,’ I said, ‘the shadows of artefacts would constitute the only reality people in this situation would recognize.’ c

‘That’s absolutely inevitable,’ he agreed. d

‘What do you think would happen, then,’ I asked, ‘if they were set free from their bonds and cured of their inanity? What would it be like if they found that happening to them? Imagine that one of them has been set free and is suddenly made to stand up, to turn his head and walk, and to look towards the firelight. It hurts him to do all this and he’s too dazzled to be capable of making out the objects whose shadows he’d formerly been looking at. And suppose someone tells him that what he’s been seeing all this time has no substance, and that he’s now closer to reality and is seeing more accurately, because of the greater reality of the things in front of his eyes—what do you imagine his reaction would be? And what do you think he’d say if he were shown any of the passing objects and had to respond to being asked what it was? Don’t you think he’d be bewildered and would think that there was more reality in what he’d been seeing before than in what he was being shown now?’

‘Far more,’ he said.

‘And if he were forced to look at the actual firelight, don’t you think it would hurt his eyes? Don’t you think he’d turn away and run back to the things he could make out, and would take the truth of the matter to be that these things are clearer than what he was being shown?’ e

‘Yes,’ he agreed.

‘And imagine him being dragged forcibly away from there up the rough, steep slope,’ I went on, ‘without being released until he’s been pulled out into the sunlight. Wouldn’t this treatment cause him pain and distress? And once he’s reached the sunlight, he wouldn’t be able to see a single one of the things which are currently taken to be real, would he, because his eyes would be overwhelmed by the sun’s beams?’

516a

‘No, he wouldn’t,’ he answered, ‘not straight away.’

‘He wouldn’t be able to see things up on the surface of the earth, I suppose, until he’d got used to his situation. At first, it would be shadows that he could most easily make out, then he’d move on to the reflections of people and so on in water, and later he’d be able to see the actual things themselves. Next, he’d feast his eyes on the heavenly bodies and the heavens themselves, which would be easier at night: he’d look at the light of the stars and the moon, rather than at the sun and sunlight during the daytime.’ b

‘Of course.’

‘And at last, I imagine, he’d be able to discern and feast his eyes on the sun—not the displaced image of the sun in water or elsewhere, but the sun on its own, in its proper place.’

‘Yes, he’d inevitably come to that,’ he said.

‘After that, he’d start to think about the sun and he’d deduce that it is the source of the seasons and the yearly cycle, that the whole of the visible realm is its domain, and that in a sense everything which he and his peers used to see is its responsibility.’ c

‘Yes, that would obviously be the next point he’d come to,’ he agreed.

‘Now, if he recalled the cell where he’d originally lived and what passed for knowledge there and his former fellow prisoners, don’t you think he’d feel happy about his own altered circumstances, and sorry for them?’

‘Definitely.’

‘Suppose that the prisoners used to assign prestige and credit to one another, in the sense that they rewarded speed at recognizing the shadows as they passed, and the ability to remember which ones normally come earlier and later and at the same time as which other ones, and expertise at using this as a basis for guessing which ones would arrive next. Do you think our former prisoner would covet these honours and would envy the people who had status and power there, or would he much prefer, as Homer describes it, “being a slave labouring for someone else—someone without property”, and would put up with anything at all, in fact, rather than share their beliefs and their life?’ d

‘Yes, I think he’d go through anything rather than live that way,’ he said. e

‘Here’s something else I’d like your opinion about,’ I said. ‘If he went back underground and sat down again in the same spot, wouldn’t the sudden transition from the sunlight mean that his eyes would be overwhelmed by darkness?’

 ‘Certainly,’ he replied.

‘Now, the process of adjustment would be quite long this time, and suppose that before his eyes had settled down and while he wasn’t seeing well, he had once again to compete against those same old prisoners at identifying those shadows. Wouldn’t he make a fool of himself? Wouldn’t they say that he’d come back from his upward journey with his eyes ruined, and that it wasn’t even worth trying to go up there? And wouldn’t they—if they could—grab hold of anyone who tried to set them free and take them up there, and kill him?’

517a

‘They certainly would,’ he said.

The Escaped Prisoner Must Go Down Into The Darkness Again To Help The Others

(Republic-519c/d to 520e):

‘Our job as founders, then,’ I said, ‘is to make sure that the best people come to that fundamental field of study (as we called it earlier): we must have them make the ascent we’ve been talking about and see goodness. And afterwards, once they’ve been up there and had a good look, we mustn’t let them get away with what they do at the moment.’  e

‘Which is what?’

 ‘Staying there,’ I replied, ‘and refusing to come back down again to those prisoners, to share their work and their rewards, no matter whether those rewards are trivial or significant.’

‘But in that case,’ he protested, ‘we’ll be wronging them: we’ll be making the quality of their lives worse and denying them the better life they could be living, won’t we?’

‘You’re again forgetting, my friend,’ I said, ‘that the point of legislation is not to make one section of a community better off than the rest, but to engineer this for the community as a whole. Legislators should persuade or compel the members of a community to mesh together, should make every individual share with his fellows the benefit which he is capable of contributing to the common welfare, and should ensure that the community does contain people with this capacity; and the purpose of all this is not for legislators to leave people to choose their own directions, but for them to use people to bind the community together.’ e

520a

‘Yes, you’re right,’ he said. ‘I was forgetting.’ b

 ‘I think you’ll also find, Glaucon,’ I said, ‘that we won’t be wronging any philosophers who arise in our community. Our remarks, as we force them to take care of their fellow citizens and be their guardians, will be perfectly fair. We’ll tell them that it’s reasonable for philosophers who happen to occur in other communities not to share the work of those communities, since their occurrence was spontaneous, rather than planned by the political system of any of the communities in question, and it’s fair for anything which arises spontaneously and doesn’t owe its nurture to anyone or anything to have no interest in repaying anyone for having provided its nourishment. “We’ve bred you, however,” we’ll say, “to act, as it were, as the hive’s leaders and kings, for your own good as well as that of the rest of the community…..

You’ve received a better and more thorough education than those other philosophers, and you’re more capable of playing a part in both spheres. So each of you must, when your time comes, descend to where the rest of the community lives, and get used to looking at things in the dark. The point is that once you become acclimatized, you’ll see infinitely better than the others there; your experience of genuine right, morality, and goodness will enable you to identify every one of the images and recognize what it is an image of.

 And then the administration of our community—ours as well as yours—will be in the hands of people who are awake, as distinct from the norm nowadays of communities being governed by people who shadow-box and fall out with one another in their dreams over who should rule, as if that were a highly desirable thing to do. No, the truth of the matter is this: the less keen the would-be rulers of a community are to rule, the better and less divided the administration of that community is bound to be, but where the rulers feel the opposite, the administration is bound to be the opposite.”’ c d

Talks in Delphi - Program for June 2021

Every Monday/Tuesday/Wednesday Evening during JUNE 2021

@ Apollon Café – High Street, Delphi. (On the lovely terrace watching the sun go down.) Meet new people and learn something new.

Meet 7.00pm for a prompt 7.15 start

3 Introductory Philosophy Talks With Time for Questions and Discussion Afterward.

(by James, throughout June 2021)

3 Introductory Talks by James:

Monday Nights: 'Know Yourself’ - Socrates tells young Alcibiades; and we will look at Plato’s book ‘First Alcibiades' to help explain this ‘apparently’ easy idea. (Will include a general introduction to Plato and Socrates if you wish…..)

Tuesday Nights: ‘The Nuts and Bolts of Plato’ - Helping us to understand and enjoy Plato’s books more by looking at 3 regular themes frequent throughout his writings – Metaphysics, Psyche (the soul) and Ethics

Wednesday Nights: Plato’s Book ‘The Phaedrus' - suggesting that LOVE is an important driving force for our journey to the stars…..  

Note: No previous study of philosophy is needed to come along and enjoy the talks, while more experienced philosophers are also welcome. Talks are in English and last about 45 minutes with time for questions afterwards.

How to find us: The Apollon Cafe is in the little High Street in Greece - and we are meeting on the outside terrace at the rear of the cafe. When you arrive - please make your way through the cafe and out on to the terrace. Please find James and let him know you are there for the talk.

Cost: Places at the Delphi/June talks are limited, and need to be reserved. Tickets are offered on a ‘pay-what-you-can’ basis. (Suggested amount for those who can is 5 to 10 euros). The subject of the talk varies on different nights of the week - so please reserve your place for the correct evening at EVENTBITE.COM at:

….. or go to ‘Greek Philosophy Talks from Delphi on Eventbrite.com

To Contact James: to arrange another time for a private talk (subject to availability) for individuals and groups email:

jamestalksgreece@hotmail.com

Believing just eighty per cent in the soul, as I suspect quite a few people do these days, can be an awkward place to be......

 

Extract From James Head’s Book – Life Choices: Important Tips From Socrates, Plato and Aristotle    https://www.amazon.com/dp/1540552624 

  Chapter 5 - Plato’s Phaedo

...... Remember, we are not meant to study Plato as if he is the font of all truth and knowledge, since in Plato’s philosophy our human soul is meant to be that font; assuming of course that we have one in the first place and that we occasionally listen to our souls if we do. His books should not be read like a religious dogma. Plato was just a philosophy teacher and writer (albeit an enormously respected one), and like any other philosophy teacher or spiritual guide, he can only point people towards the truth. The student must then put one foot in front of the other and walk at his or her own pace towards the truth.

Plato writes to stimulate our investigation and exploration of the truth, and many of the questions he raises and asks us to consider for ourselves are important signs for us to follow; especially if we want to ‘prove’ the existence of the soul to our own satisfaction at least – or alternatively perhaps disprove it. Believing just eighty per cent in the soul, as I suspect quite a few people do these days, can be an awkward place to be. Generally speaking, ‘life’ is much easier and straightforward if you believe (or disbelieve) one hundred per cent.  (Even at the end of The Phaedo, one of Socrates’ closest friends Simmias, says he is still not certain about the existence of the soul.)

It is interesting to note that the word ‘theory’ literally means ‘to contemplate’ in Greek, and Socrates and Plato only want us all to come to our own theories and opinions on these matters, hopefully with well thought out reasons to back them up. Very usefully, in my opinion, Socrates and Plato offer us a structured approach towards such contemplation and investigation which all too often is a rather vague or confusing undertaking. When investigating anything (even the existence of the soul), having a structured approach helps us to arrive at our own opinions on many important spiritual and practical matters.

Be careful as you take those first philosophical steps through the pages of The Phaedo, since Plato combines accepted factual information, well known Greek myths, lesser known allegories, and some divine riddles of his own making within his text. He does this to stimulate our minds, promote our understanding of reality, and allow us to create our own unique paths towards the truth, and perhaps also to the mystical visions he describes. Plato is opening some windows for us to look through to see new things, or perhaps just to see some familiar things again but from a different perspective.

Let me now set the scene of The Phaedo a little more for people either new to this book or indeed to Socratic philosophy generally. Socrates aged 70 has been found guilty by the law courts of ancient Athens of impiety and corrupting the youth of the city, and has been sentenced to death. It is 400 years BCE……..

On the nature of Good and Evil - 01

Good and Evil – What is it?

       In the Phaedo, after Socrates has his chains removed, he says that he feels a pleasure from his legs where the chains had been just a short while before. He suggests that pain and pleasure may be part of the same thing - and perhaps joined together in some way with a common head. In other words, he suggests that these two opposites are connected in some way.  Indeed, in the Socratic thought, the connection of various opposites is a common thought - i.e. something can only become hot if it was cooler before; the fast running race horse must have been running slowly to begin with before it was running fast. We can think of many more smaller ‘particular’ examples of this connection of opposites by a common root or thread.

       However, also in the Phaedo, when Socrates gives his first ‘proof’ of why he thinks that the soul exists (from his five proofs) he talks about the proof of ‘generation of opposites’ and that life is generated from death, and vice versa. As a proof that the soul exists, I do not find this convincing, and my reasons are not important for the purposes of this short article on good and evil. Nevertheless, it does suggest another level of ‘opposites’ being connected in some way.

        So, when trying to decide what good and evil are and where they come from - one avenue of exploration and personal investigation is to consider whether good and evil are connected in some way.

       Secondly, we can consider whether good and evil are external forces acting in the world around us – or even throughout the universe. Are good and evil simply just human qualities – since we all seem to have the possibility of good and evil actions within us - but hopefully choose ‘good’ (or at least ‘relatively good’) actions over evil ones. Sometimes the situation gets a little blurred since if you killed 10 enemy soldiers in a war you might well receive a medal from your government for doing so. However, were you to kill the same 10 soldiers after the war had ended as they enjoyed a drink and discussed old stories of the war, you would be arrested and put on trial for murder.

       I would suggest that good and evil may simply be predominantly human qualities, since when the lioness kills the antelope to feed her Cubs - it is not considered an act of evil; but a man killing his neighbours for no apparent reason would probably be considered so by many. Similarly, when an earthquake kills 200 people we do not consider it as an act of evil. However, when the religious fanatic blows up a passenger aeroplane, or leaves a bomb in a bar full of young people enjoying a drink or a concert, then we do regard the killing of the 200 people as an act of evil. As in most philosophical thought, the practical details appear important; or are good and evil ‘absolutes’ of ‘perfect ideas’ and therefore never changing?

       Now in traditional platonic thought (or at least as suggested by the later commentator Proclus some 800 years after Plato) evil as such does not exist; since the whole universe in his view flows out of the one source of everything; and that one source is always good. In this view, evil does not exist - only a lack or even complete absence of the ‘the good’.  In regard to our human concept of evil and evil actions by some people; this idea suggests that evil actions are simply a lack of ‘good judgement’ or the inability to make a ‘good’ rational choice. For example, an otherwise good man might kill another man in a moment of anger - and thus have committed an evil act as a lack of good judgement; and he would no doubt regret his action the following day. Similarly, but somewhat differently, the madman who kills his neighbour over a minor matter would be lacking the healthy and good mind in order to make a good rational choice. Even if he  did not regret his action the next day if in a confused and unstable mental state, in many ways it would be hard to define his actions as a result of some ‘evil power’ operating within the universe, or at least within anthropomorphic part of it. The man was simply unwell and lacking a good healthy mind to make a reasonable action.

       Most organised religions with influence in our modern day promote the idea of evil as being some kind of divine power and give various explanations of how it came into being in the first place (fallen angles etc), and how it operates - and who it operates on and through.

       The above few short paragraphs offer no clear answers – but simply allow us to start our investigation of evil. Socrates advises us in many of his conversations with people, that is wise before you start to discuss something, that you define exactly what you mean by the term being discussed - i.e. evil in this case. Is it a divine and malignant force operating in the universe (as suggested in the Star Wars movies or some major organised religions today) that affects us all if we are not very careful; or is it simply when human beings make badly judged or irrational actions.

       Additionally, if good and evil are in some way linked (as are pain and pleasure as previously discussed above regarding the removal of Socrates chains) it would suggest that all of us have the potential for evil thoughts and deeds unless we are careful with our thoughts and actions - and have control and discipline over our desires, tempers, and other emotions. We might do well therefore, to consider ways that encourage us and help us to keep our emotions under control; and how to avoid things that slowly lead us towards bad and evil acts. For example, the police officer who accepts a small bribe this month from a drug dealer for a small favour- is likely to find him or herself is at risk a month or 2 later of being forced to take another bribe for a much more serious favour. The person who makes small false declarations with their company expenses this month, is more likely in a month or 2 to make bigger force declarations - and risk losing their good name, job and most importantly for philosophers – VIRTUE.

       In my view, we have to be real careful about things that tempt us towards small acts of badness or corruption, since these small steps lead us down the start of a path that may be difficult to stop once we had started.

       As in Plato’s Phaedrus - the charioteer must try to use the horse which is good and noble, rather than that which is ugly, selfish, brutish, and bad in every other way.

Socrates advises us to 'Know Thyself' - or do we already know what we are ?

My previous blog post discussed the idea of 'double ignorance' and the essential two qualities a philosopher needs being to 'wonder' about things and to have the curiosity to find out things when we do not know. This blog post develops this theme with a quick look at Plato's book: The First Alcibiades - where the question is posed: Do we really know 'what' the human being is?  This question in Socratic philosophy is often summarised as the need for us all to 'Know Thyself'.....

'Socrates points out to Alcibiades that unless we are aware (or at least have it pointed out to us) that we do not know something, we will not try to find out about that thing and try to correct our lack of knowledge in that area. Socrates says, as discussed in the introduction to this book, that we will fall into the trap of being ‘doubly ignorant’. That is; firstly not knowing something; but secondly thinking that we do know about it so that we do not even bother to inform ourselves and correct this lack of knowledge. Incidentally, an ancient Oracle (places where the future was predicted and where questions about all sorts of things were thought to be answered by the Gods) once said, when asked who was the wisest man alive, that it was in fact Socrates. This confused Socrates a great deal, and the only reason he could come up with for the Oracle’s answer was that at least he knew he knew nothing which made him a lot wiser than the people who thought they knew about things when clearly they did not.

It is no problem if we do not know something – providing we realise we do not know. These days we consult lawyers and solicitors on legal matters, and accountants about financial matters. We know we are not experts in these areas and so we consult with people who are trained and experienced with these specialist subjects. We talk to doctors about medical matters, and mechanics about problems with our cars. It is normal to do so and it is no big problem not to know something providing you are aware of it and indeed admit it to yourself and others when necessary. In modern day life we consult experts on a whole range of subjects. Presidents and Prime Ministers have whole teams of specialist advisors in different areas where they know they have little or no specialist expertise or experience themselves.

All simple enough so far….. Socrates has made Alcibiades admit to himself that he lacks knowledge and experience - with politics and affairs of State in this case. However, then Socrates goes a step further by discussing that if we are going to teach ‘ourselves’ about things or otherwise look after ourselves wisely (i.e. make the best Life Choices for ourselves), then we better have some understanding at least of what ‘the self’ actually is, and this is truly what ‘Knowing Thyself’ is all about. Socrates agrees that you have to know where you are before starting a philosophical path (or any other path); but he says it is also important to know ‘what you are’, and this is what it truly means to Know Thyself in the Socratic sense. Socrates is asking:

How can we look after something well (including ourselves) if we do not even know what it is?

So what does Socrates say ‘the self’ is; or in other words: what kind of creatures are we? Well he discusses with Alcibiades that there is obviously a difference between someone taking care of their shoes and taking care of their feet. He says that the shoes are merely added on to the feet and are not the actual feet them self. Similarly, he mentions that rings are merely added on to the hands and are not the hands or indeed the actual person themselves. Alcibiades agrees as Socrates explains by asking him more short questions to answer. Socrates then points out that there is a difference between the tools a craftsman uses, such as a shoemaker using a knife to cut the leather, and the shoemaker himself. In the same way the musical instrument the musician uses is different to the actual musician who again only makes use of the instrument. Such things are only used by the 'self' and Socrates wants Alcibiades to understand the distinction between the person them self and the things he or she merely uses. Of course Alcibiades agrees to these examples, and this may all seem very obvious to us and perhaps unnecessary for Socrates to explain to Alcibiades. However, Socrates is creating universals or universal principles and truths in his young student’s mind. Socrates is getting Alcibiades to follow his path of logic and the steps of his argument one step at a time, almost like a geometric mathematical proof. (Perhaps this is another reason why Plato wrote those strange words above the entrance to his Academy?)

Socrates then makes the distinction between the eyes and hands that a shoemakers or musician makes use of compared to the shoemaker and musician themselves. Alcibiades agrees that the shoemaker and musician merely use their hands and eyes but that they are not actually the shoemaker or musician. He goes on to explain that this is the same with the arms, legs, feet, etc. that while they are used by the musician and the shoemaker they are not the actual musician or shoemaker themselves; they are just added on to whatever the musician or shoemaker actually is ‘in essence’ and are merely used by them. Let me now quote direct from Plato's dialogue what comes next (First Alcibiades-129c/d):

SOCRATES: But the tool is not the same as the cutter and user of the tool?

ALCIBIADES: Of course not.

SOCRATES: And in the same way the instrument of the harper (musician) is to be distinguished from the harper himself?

ALCIBIADES: It is.

SOCRATES: Now the question which I asked was whether you conceive the user to be always different from that which he uses

ALCIBIADES: I do.

SOCRATES: Then what shall we say of the shoemaker? Does he cut with his tools only or with his hands?

ALCIBIADES: With his hands as well.

SOCRATES: He uses his hands too?

ALCIBIADES: Yes.

SOCRATES: And does he use his eyes in cutting leather?

ALCIBIADES: He does.

SOCRATES: And we admit that the user is not the same with the things which he uses?

ALCIBIADES: Yes.

SOCRATES: Then the shoemaker and the harper are to be distinguished from the hands and feet which they use?

ALCIBIADES: Clearly.

SOCRATES: And does not a man use the whole body?

ALCIBIADES: Certainly.

SOCRATES: And that which uses is different from that which is used?

ALCIBIADES: True.

SOCRATES: Then a man is not the same as his own body

ALCIBIADES: That is the inference. 

SOCRATES: What is he, then? 

ALCIBIADES: I cannot say. [i.e. I don't know... ]

Just notice that as soon as Alcibiades says: 'I cannot say' or 'I don't know' he suddenly ceases to be doubly ignorant on this matter. He had always assumed that he at least knew what he was - and so had not thought about it much. Socrates with his questions has suddenly made him realise that he does not really know 'what' he is, and that it is something he needs to investigate and think about from now on.'

From Essay 1 of James’ new book ‘Life Choice – Important Tips From Socrates, Plato and Aristotle’ (p. 25 – 27)

See paperback at: https://www.createspace.com/6627322

See eBook at: https://www.amazon.com/dp/1540552624  

Avoiding 'Double Ignorance' & With Practical Philosophy Action Must Follow Investigation

In order to make up our own minds on various issues we must of course first ‘wonder’ about these things in the first place, but then secondly, we must have sufficient curiosity to find out why things are the way they are. Only if we really know what fairness, honesty, and goodness actually are can we make an informed decision about them.  Of course, we will not find out about these and other things if we already think we know all the answers to everything; we will remain what Socrates describes as ‘doubly ignorant’; that is; not knowing something – but thinking that we do and therefore not bothering to find out what something really is, or what are the correct answers in a particular situation.

Traditional Socratic (+ Platonic and Aristotelian) philosophy is also very much a practical subject and not just an intellectual pursuit. It is certainly not the sole preserve of university academics and their students. Philosophy is much too important to be left in just a few hands - it is something that we all need to be engaged with. For example, Aristotle (the student of Plato who was the student of Socrates) asks what would be the point of us just being wiser intellectually if it was not going to improve our lives (as individuals or various communities) and make us happier and better people on a practical level in the real world. A simple modern example is the Board or management meetings that many commercial companies and other organisations have regularly to discuss things like what went well in the previous months, and what could be done better in the months ahead. Well there is absolutely no point in having such meetings unless some of the ideas on how to improve things in the months ahead are implemented after the meeting – or at least efforts are made to implement them whether successful or not. There would be absolutely no point in having a Board or management meeting otherwise.

Socratic philosophy is concerned with many practical areas of our daily lives but three main areas of philosophic discussion or investigation can usually be identified. Firstly, there is the consideration of what ‘the good life’ actually is and how to lead it on a personal level. Metaphorically speaking this can be thought of as looking inwards at ourselves.  Secondly, there is the investigation of good politics and society for the best life possible of our communities and societies, almost looking outwards towards other people and society at large. Thirdly, there is the investigation of the divine and spiritual (metaphysical) areas that many people often associate with philosophy; how did I get here, and where I am going; is there a God or a heaven? We can think of these types of questions and investigations as looking ‘upwards’…….

From the introduction of James’ new paper version of his book ‘Life Choice – Important Tips From Socrates, Plato and Aristotle’ (p.8)

Thrasymachus calls Socrates a fool in Plato’s Republic - Is He Right ?

Thrasymachus calls Socrates a fool in Plato’s Republic for not approving of corrupt politicians] Is Thrasymachus right? Comments welcome below…..

Near the beginning of The Republic around lines 343 b / c   Thrasymachus says:

     ‘You fool, Socrates, don’t you see? In any and every situation, a moral person is worse off than an immoral one. Suppose, for instance, that they’re doing some business together, which involves one of them entering into association with the other: by the time the association is dissolved, you’ll never find the moral person up on the immoral one— he’ll be worse off. Or again, in civic matters, if there’s a tax on property,* then a moral person pays more tax than an immoral one even when they’re both equally well off; and if there’s a hand-out, then the one gets nothing, while the other makes a lot. And when each of them holds political office,* even if a moral person loses out financially in no other way, his personal affairs deteriorate through neglect, while his morality stops him making any profit from public funds, and moreover his family and friends fall out with him over his refusal to help them out in unfair ways; in all these respects, however, an immoral person’s experience is the opposite.

344a ‘I’m talking about the person I described a short while ago, the one with the power to secure huge advantages for himself. This is the person you should consider, if you want to assess the extent to which immorality rather than morality is personally advantageous— and this is something you’ll appreciate most easily if you look at immorality in its most perfect form and see how it enhances a wrongdoer’s life beyond measure, but ruins the lives of his victims, who haven’t the stomach for crime, to the same degree. It’s dictatorship I mean, because whether it takes stealth or overt violence, a dictator steals what doesn’t belong to him— consecrated and unconsecrated objects, private possessions, and public property— and does so not on a small scale, but comprehensively.

Anyone who is caught committing the merest fraction of these crimes is not only punished, but thoroughly stigmatized as well: small-scale criminals who commit these kinds of crimes are called temple-robbers,* kidnappers, burglars, thieves, and robbers. On the other hand, when someone appropriates the assets of the citizen body and then goes on to rob them of their very freedom and enslave them, then denigration gives way to congratulation, and it isn’t only his fellow citizens who call him happy, but anyone else who hears about his consummate wrongdoing does so as well. The point is that immorality has a bad name because people are afraid of being at the receiving end of it, not of doing it. 

(344 b c)   ‘So you see, Socrates, immorality— if practised on a large enough scale— has more power, licence, and authority than morality. And as I said at the beginning, morality is really the advantage of the stronger party, while immorality is profitable and advantageous to oneself. '

Diotima on Love - Extracts

From Plato’s book; The Symposium (The Drinking Party)

Several speakers give a short speech saying what they think love is; and then finally Socrates says what he thinks love is. His speech includes the speech of the mysterious wise woman Diotima who instructs Socrates in love when he was a young man. Below is an extract from Diotima’s wise words.

Then Diotima says to Socrates:

'These are the lesser mysteries of love, into which even you, Socrates, may enter; to the greater and more hidden ones which are the crown of these, and to which, if you pursue them in a right spirit, they will lead, I know not whether you will be able to attain. But I will do my utmost to inform you, and do you follow if you can. For he who would proceed aright in this matter should begin in youth to visit beautiful forms; and first, if he be guided by his instructor aright, to love one such form only—out of that he should create fair thoughts; and soon he will of himself perceive that the beauty of one form is akin to the beauty of another; and then if beauty of form in general is his pursuit, how foolish would he be not to recognize that the beauty in every form is and the same! And when he perceives this he will abate his violent love of the one, which he will despise and deem a small thing, and will become a lover of all beautiful forms; in the next stage he will consider that the beauty of the mind is more honourable than the beauty of the outward form. So that if a virtuous soul have but a little comeliness, he will be content to love and tend him, and will search out and bring to the birth thoughts which may improve the young, until he is compelled to contemplate and see the beauty of institutions and laws, and to understand that the beauty of them all is of one family, and that personal beauty is a trifle; and after laws and institutions he will go on to the sciences, that he may see their beauty, being not like a servant in love with the beauty of one youth or man or institution, himself a slave mean and narrow-minded, but drawing towards and contemplating the vast sea of beauty, he will create many fair and noble thoughts and notions in boundless love of wisdom; until on that shore he grows and waxes strong, and at last the vision is revealed to him of a single science, which is the science of beauty everywhere.

To this I will proceed; please to give me your very best attention: 'He who has been instructed thus far in the things of love, and who has learned to see the beautiful in due order and succession, when he comes toward the end will suddenly perceive a nature of wondrous beauty (and this, Socrates, is the final cause of all our former toils)—a nature which in the first place is everlasting, not growing and decaying, or waxing and waning; secondly, not fair in one point of view and foul in another, or at one time or in one relation or at one place fair, at another time or in another relation or at another place foul, as if fair to some and foul to others, or in the likeness of a face or hands or any other part of the bodily frame, or in any form of speech or knowledge, or existing in any other being, as for example, in an animal, or in heaven, or in earth, or in any other place; but beauty absolute, separate, simple, and everlasting, which without diminution and without increase, or any change, is imparted to the ever-growing and perishing beauties of all other things. He who from these ascending under the influence of true love, begins to perceive that beauty, is not far from the end. And the true order of going, or being led by another, to the things of love, is to begin from the beauties of earth and mount upwards for the sake of that other beauty, using these as steps only, and from one going on to two, and from two to all fair forms, and from fair forms to fair practices, and from fair practices to fair notions, until from fair notions he arrives at the notion of absolute beauty, and at last knows what the essence of beauty is.

This, my dear Socrates,' said the stranger of Mantineia, 'is that life above all others which man should live, in the contemplation of beauty absolute; a beauty which if you once beheld, you would see not to be after the measure of gold, and garments, and fair youths, whose presence now entrances you; and you and many a one would be content to live seeing them only and conversing with them without meat or drink, if that were possible—you only want to look at them and to be with them. But what if man had eyes to see the true beauty—the divine beauty, I mean, pure and clear and unalloyed, not clogged with the pollutions of mortality and all the colours and vanities of human life—thither looking, and holding converse with the true beauty simple and divine? Remember how in that communion only, beholding beauty with the eye of the mind, he will be enabled to bring forth, not images of beauty, but realities (for he has hold not of an image but of a reality), and bringing forth and nourishing true virtue to become the friend of God and be immortal, if mortal man may. Would that be an ignoble life?'

Bite Size Comments on ‘Parmenides’ by Plato

Using Translation by H. N. Fowler / Heinemann

(Note: Delightful short 2 -3 page introductions by Fowler)

In my opinion it is the first 15 pages or so of this 35 page dialogue that are by far the most interesting. For me the latter pages are rather hard work to read and frankly become rather tedious. Of course, I accept that this view may not be shared by some readers of this text and I will come to back to this point again below.

The dialogue begins with Plato describing how Cephalus relates a storey that was told to him by Antiphon; who heard it from Pythodorus– who was present as a listener when Parmenides (the great Eleatic philosopher) conversed with a young Socrates (apx 20 years old we suppose) and other listeners. It is therefore dramatised by Plato as a 4^th or 5^thhand account of the original tale - and this is emphasised for some reason –and perhaps for important or understandable reasons? This dialogue is therefore a good illustration of how the Socratic-Platonic philosophic tradition was kept alive by an oral rather than purely written tradition.

Plato starts his dialogue as usual by giving the dramatic setting, and with Socrates refuting some of Zeno’s paradoxes (who is also present at the discussion) which he claims not to be paradoxes at all. Parmenides has said “the one [divine] exists” and gives a number of proofs – and Zeno has said that “the many does not exist”. According to Socrates, Zeno has taken the same view as Parmenides and merely expressed it the other way around and so his ideas are nothing new and not a paradox.

Parmenides congratulates young Socrates on his observations and then the experienced and respected philosopher advises him on how to develop his philosophical skills – and recommends certain practical “training”methods. Firstly he sensibly suggests (paragraph starting line 136a) that:

     ‘…if you wish to get better training (in philosophy and knowledge), you must do something more …. you must consider not only what happens if a particular hypothesis is true; but also what happens if it is not true.’

Parmenides then explains in more detail what he mean by this – and the various angles from which we should discuss a topic from. Socrates exclaims that this is a “stupendous amount of work” he is suggesting; but is it I wonder? Or is it just an hour or two today and another hour or two tomorrow and for a few days thereafter to examine any hypothesis in some detail and from all the various angles? Indeed, if we wish to suggest a hypothesis on anything serious, important or worthwhile ourselves, should we not – as trainee or “real” philosophers – be examining the implications of what we are saying from all angles as a pre-requisite. Would it not be better to say that we do not have an opinion on something if we have not carried out this work which Parmenides suggests is essential first?

Socrates then asks Parmenides to take a hypothesis of his own choice as an example and then discuss it from various angles to demonstrate what he means by this suggested method; to which Parmenides says: ‘….. this is a great task…. to impose on a man my age…. ‘. At line 136 E, Pythodorus tells Socrates:

      ‘If there were more of us, it would not be fair to ask it of him, for it is not suitable for him to speak on such subjects before many, especially at his age; for the many do not know for except by this devious passage through all things the mind cannot attain the truth.’

Parmenides agrees to Socrates’ request and suggests for an example hypothesis the supposition: ‘that the one exists…. or that it does not exist.’

[Suggestion for facilitators and group leaders – if you are studying this text with students – I think this is a good point to stop and first get the students to discuss the hypothesis themselves for an hour at least before reading further and seeing how Parmenides himself goes about it. You may even wish to leave the students to think about the above supposition for themselves for the rest of the morning/day…. and then perhaps make their own short presentations – before reading further with the text.]

At line 142.B Parmenides says:

     ‘Shall we then return to our hypothesis and see if a review of our argument discloses any new point of view?’

He then proceeds to summarise and develop his previous arguments in just a page or two. All nice and succinct and clear you might be thinking but I do not feel this to be the case. For example, Parmenides asks Socrates:

      ‘In this way: If being is predicated of the one which exists and unity is predicated of being which is one , and being and one are not the same, but belong to the existent one of our hypothesis , must not the existent one be a whole of which the one and being are parts?’

To which Socrates replies (almost amusingly in my own view): ‘Inevitably…’ Is Socrates joking? It seems like a rather complicated and bewildering statement for Socrates to give such a reply that he thought the statement obvious or inevitable. Perhaps the truth is they have both left me behind in terms of intellect or in terms of interest by this asking questions this way and then that – and then back the other way again. And I wonder, in truth – which is the subject of our discussion here, are they any closer to proving or deciding or knowing whether the divine is “One “ or “many” at the end of it all?

There then follows a discussion on the existence of the one and of ‘being’ itself. At line 160.B (P.311 Fowler) Parmenides in keeping with the training method he has earlier suggested to Socrates asks:

     ‘Well, and ought we not next to consider what must happens if one does not exist?’

For expediency with this blog I will quote here two paragraphs from the Wikipedia website:

      'This difficult second part of the dialogue is generally agreed to be one of the most challenging, and sometimes bizarre, pieces in the whole of the Platonic corpus. It consists of an unrelenting series of difficult and subtle arguments, where the exchange is stripped of all but the bare essentials of the arguments involved. Gone are the drama and colour we are accustomed to from [Plato’s] earlier dialogues.

      The long, austere second half of the dialogue is organised as a series of eight (or alternatively, nine deductions about the relation of the one to the many. The reasoning is often, as are Parmenides' arguments in the first section of the work, obscure, and at times appears to be blatantly fallacious. Further, the deductions appear to be set up in a way to deliberately produce antinomies, or mutually contradictory conclusions…..’

Wikipedia then list the main points covered in the rest of the dialogue at: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Parmenides_(dialogue).However, although perhaps convenient, this summary by Wikipedia may be an over simplification of the discussion in the second half of the dialogue. If you want to read a little deeper there is as usual a good longer essay on the Stanford University website at:http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/plato-parmenides 

“Bite Size” Summary:

As mentioned at the start of this blog while I enjoyed very much indeed the first 15 pages or so of this dialogue, I did find the latter pages rather hard going and dry: and as you must know by now I am usually a big fan of Plato’s writings on many fronts including the vivid myths, rich flowing language, humour and general readability. Below I give two opposing views on the dialogue by respected commentators: the first by H N Lamb who seems to sympathise with my own view (and that expressed above by Wikipedia) to some extent, and then secondly a quote from the 15^th Century Neoplatonist Marsilio Ficino who feels that in this dialogue Plato:

      ‘…surpasses even himself - to bring forth this work miraculously from the adytum of the divine mind and from the innermost sanctum of philosophy.’

Firstly Lamb writes:

      ‘There can be no doubt that Plato’s contemporaries, living in the atmosphere of philosophical discussion which pervaded the Athens of those days; understood many of the allusions in the text which are lost on us, and were able to appreciate Plato’s point of view more fully than any modern scholar can hope to do, but even for them the result of this dialogue must have been chiefly, if not entirely negative. In greater or lesser degree the same is true of several other dialogues which appear to belong to nearly the same date. Such are the Theaetetus, the Cratylus, the Sophist, the Statesman, and the Philibus. These all seem to be more or less polemical, and in most of them the interest in method is evident. ’

However, Marsilio Ficino says:

     ‘While Plato sprinkled the seeds of all wisdom throughout all his dialogues, yet he collected the precepts of moral philosophy in the books on the Republic, the whole of science in the Timaeus, and he comprehended the whole of theology in the Parmenides. And whereas in the other works he rises far above all other philosophers, in this one he seems to surpass even himself and to bring forth this work miraculously from the adytum of the divine mind and from the innermost sanctum of philosophy. Whosoever undertakes the reading of this sacred book shall first prepare himself in a sober mind and detached spirit, before he makes bold to tackle the mysteries of this heavenly work. For here Plato discusses his own thoughts most subtly: how the One itself is the principle of all things, which is above all things and from which all things are, and in what manner it is outside everything and in everything, and how everything is from it, through it, and toward it.’ (Klibansky, 1941)

Certainly Parmenides is not one of Plato’s easier texts, and people will delight or otherwise by reading it. As with all things I recommend making your own minds up and taking a couple of hours at least to have a look at that first 15 pages I mentioned above which I found interesting and worthwhile.

James (London - Jan 2013)