Time will be limited to read text together at the talk, and so we will use only use points v, viii, and ix of the extracts below at our meetup talk on March 3rd 2021.
How Can We Measure Our Progress In
Virtue (Morals) & Philosophy?’
From Plutarch’s
book of essays: Moralia.
(Extracts Translated to
English by Arthur Richard Shilleto, M.A.)
EXTRACTS
§ v. …………………… …….. ‘Similarly they relate of Diogenes of Sinope, when he began to be a philosopher, that the Athenians were celebrating a festival, and there were public banquets and shows and mutual festivities, and drinking and revelling all night, and he, coiled up in a corner of the market-place intending to sleep, fell into a train of thought likely seriously to turn him from his purpose and shake his resolution, for he reflected that he had adopted without any necessity a toilsome and unusual kind of life, and by his own fault sat there debarred of all the good things. At that moment, however, they say a mouse stole up and began to munch some of the crumbs of his barley-cake, and he plucked up his courage and said to himself, in a railing and chiding fashion, "What say you, Diogenes? Do your leavings give this mouse a sumptuous meal, while you, the gentleman, wail and lament because you are not getting drunk yonder and reclining on soft and luxurious couches?" Whenever such depressions of mind are not frequent, and the mind when they take place quickly recovers from them, after having put them to flight as it were, and when such annoyance and distraction is easily got rid of, then one may consider one's progress in virtue as a certainty.
§ vi. And since not only the things that in
themselves shake and turn them in the opposite direction are more powerful in
the case of weak philosophers, but also the serious advice of friends, and the
playful and jeering objections of adversaries bend and soften people, and have
ere now shaken some out of philosophy altogether, it will be no slight
indication of one's progress in virtue if one takes all this very calmly, and
is neither disturbed nor aggravated by people who tell us and mention to us that
some of our former comrades are flourishing in kings' courts, or have married
wives with dowries, or are attended by a crowd of friends when they come down
to the forum to solicit some office or advocateship. He that is not moved or
affected by all this is already plainly one upon whom philosophy has got a
right hold; for it is impossible that we should cease to be envious of what
most people admire, unless the admiration of virtue was strongly implanted in
us. For over-confidence may be generated in some by anger and folly, but to
despise what men admire is not possible without a true and steady elevation of
mind. And so people in such a condition of mind, comparing it with that of
others, pride themselves on it, and say with Solon, "We would not change virtue
for wealth, for while virtue abides, wealth changes hands, and now one man, now
another, has it."
And Diogenes compared his shifting about from Corinth to Athens, and again from Thebes to Corinth, to the different residences of the King of Persia, as his spring residence at Susa, his winter residence at Babylon, and his summer residence in Media. And Agesilaus said of the great king, "How is he better than me, if he is not more upright?" And Aristotle, writing to Antipater about Alexander, said, "that he ought not to think highly of himself because he had many subjects, for anyone who had right notions about the gods was entitled to think quite as highly of himself." And Zeno, observing that Theophrastus was admired for the number of his pupils, said, "His choir is, I admit, larger than mine, but mine is more harmonious."
§ vii. Whenever then, by thus comparing the advantages of
virtue with external things, you get rid of envies and jealousies and those
things which fret and depress the minds of many who are novices in philosophy,
this also is a great indication of your progress in virtue. Another and no
slight indication is a change in the style of your discourses. For generally
speaking all novices in philosophy adopt most such as tend to their own
glorification; some, like birds, in their levity and ambition soaring to the
height and brightness of physical things; others like young puppies, as Plato
says, rejoicing in tearing and biting, betake themselves to strifes and
questions and sophisms; but most plunging themselves into dialectics
immediately store themselves for sophistry; and some collect sentences and
histories and go about (as Anacharsis said he saw the Greeks used money for no
other purpose but to count it up), merely piling up and comparing them, but
making no practical use of them.
Applicable here is that saying of Antiphanes, which someone applied to Plato's pupils. Antiphanes said playfully that in a certain city words were frozen directly they were spoken, owing to the great cold, and were thawed again in the summer, so that one could then hear what had been said in the winter. So he said of the words which were spoken by Plato to young men, that most of them only understood them late in life when they were become old men. And this is the condition people are in in respect to all philosophy, until the judgement gets into a sound and healthy state, and begins to adapt itself to those things which can produce character and greatness of mind, and to seek discourses whose footsteps turn inwards rather than outwards, to borrow the language of Æsop. For as Sophocles said he had first toned down the pompous style of Æschylus, then his harsh and over-artificial method, and had in the third place changed his manner of diction, a most important point and one that is most intimately connected with the character, so those who go in for philosophy, when they have passed from flattering and artificial discourses to such as deal with character and emotion, are beginning to make genuine and modest progress in virtue.
§ viii. Furthermore, take care, in reading the
writings of philosophers or hearing their speeches, that you do not attend to
words more than things, nor get attracted more by what is difficult and curious
than by what is serviceable and solid and useful. And also, in studying poems
or history, let nothing escape you of what is said to the point, which is
likely either to correct the character or to calm the passions. For as
Simonides says the bee hovers among the flowers "making the yellow
honey," while others value and pluck flowers only for their beauty and
fragrance, so of all that read poems for pleasure and amusement he alone that
finds and gathers what is valuable seems capable of knowledge from his
acquaintance with and friendship for what is noble and good. For those who study Plato and Xenophon only
for their style, and cull out only what is pure and Attic, and as it were the
dew and the bloom, do they not resemble people who love drugs for their smell
and colour, but care not for them as anodynes or purges, and are not aware of
those properties? Whereas those who have more proficiency can derive benefit
not from discourses only, but from sights and actions, and cull what is good
and useful, as is recorded of Æschylus and other similar kind of men. As to
Æschylus, when he was watching a contest in boxing at the Isthmus, and the
whole theatre cried out upon one of the boxers being beaten, he nudged with his
elbow Ion of Chios, and said, "Do you observe the power of training? The
beaten man holds his peace, while the spectators cry out." And Brasidas
having caught hold of a mouse among some figs, being bitten by it let it go,
and said to himself, "Hercules, there is no creature so small or weak that
it will not fight for its life!"
And Diogenes, seeing a lad drinking water out of the palm of his hand, threw away the cup which he kept in his wallet. So much does attention and assiduous practice make people perceptive and receptive of what contributes to virtue from any source. And this is the case still more with those who mix discourses with actions, who not only, to use the language of Thucydides, "exercise themselves in the presence of danger," but also in regard to pleasures and strifes, and judgements, and advocateships, and magistrateships make a display of their opinions, or rather form their opinions by their practice. For we can no more think those philosophers who are ever learning and busy and investigating what they have got from philosophy, and then straightway publish it in the market-place or in the haunt of young men, or at a royal supper-party, any more than we give the name of physicians to those who sell drugs and mixtures. Nay rather such a sophist differs very little at all from the bird described in Homer, offering his scholars like it whatever he has got, and as it feeds its callow young from its own mouth, "though it goes ill with itself," so he gets no advantage or food from what he has got for himself.
§ ix. We must therefore see to it that our
discourse be serviceable to ourselves, and that it may not appear to others to
be vain-glorious or ambitious, and we must show that we are as willing to
listen as to teach, and especially must we lay aside all disputatiousness and
love of strife in controversy, and cease bandying fierce words with one another
as if we were contending with one another at boxing, and leave off rejoicing
more in smiting and knocking down one another than in learning and teaching.
For in such cases moderation and mildness, and to commence arguing without
quarrelsomeness and to finish without getting into a rage, and neither to be
insolent if you come off best in the argument, nor dejected if you come off
worst, is a sufficient sign of progress in virtue. Aristippus was an excellent
example of this, when overcome in argument by the sophistry of a man, who had
plenty of assurance, but was generally speaking mad or half-witted. Observing
that he was in great joy and very puffed up at his victory, he said, "I
who have been vanquished in the argument shall have a better night's rest than
my victor."
We can also test ourselves in regard to public speaking, if we are not timid and do not shrink from speaking when a large audience has unexpectedly been got together, nor dejected when we have only a small one to harangue to, and if we do not, when we have to speak to the people or before some magistrate, miss the opportunity through want of proper preparation; for these things are recorded both of Demosthenes and Alcibiades. As for Alcibiades, though he possessed a most excellent understanding, yet from want of confidence in speaking he often broke down, and in trying to recall a word or thought that slipped his memory had to stop short. And Homer did not deny that his first line was unmetrical, though he had sufficient confidence to follow it up by so many other lines, so great was his genius. Much more then ought those who aim at virtue and what is noble to lose no opportunity of public speaking, paying very little attention to either uproar or applause at their speeches.
§ x. And not,,,,,,,,,,,,
x x x x x x x x x x
The full text of Plutarch's essay and others in his Moralia is available as follows:
Available free in English on Amazon (Kindle):
https://www.amazon.com/Plutarchs-Morals-Plutarch-ebook/dp/B0082W83DO
(Full Plutarch essay available for free and easily
printable from:
https://jameslongerstuff.blogspot.com/2016/06/this-down-to-earth-essay-by-plutarch.html
Also, there is a more contemporary translation by
Robin Waterfield at:
https://www.amazon.com/Essays-Penguin-Classics-Plutarch/dp/0140445641
For Greek readers - This essay is available in ancient+modern Greek from
the delightful Kaktos bookshop – (temporarily selling online rather than in
Panepistimeo) – see Book 2 of Plutarch’s Ethics at:
(Pages 171
to 221 …. odd pages only - is the essay I will be talking about in ‘modern’
Greek. The ‘even’ pages are Ancient Greek.)
