Bite Size Comments on ‘Parmenides’ by Plato

Using Translation by H. N. Fowler / Heinemann

(Note: Delightful short 2 -3 page introductions by Fowler)

In my opinion it is the first 15 pages or so of this 35 page dialogue that are by far the most interesting. For me the latter pages are rather hard work to read and frankly become rather tedious. Of course, I accept that this view may not be shared by some readers of this text and I will come to back to this point again below.

The dialogue begins with Plato describing how Cephalus relates a storey that was told to him by Antiphon; who heard it from Pythodorus– who was present as a listener when Parmenides (the great Eleatic philosopher) conversed with a young Socrates (apx 20 years old we suppose) and other listeners. It is therefore dramatised by Plato as a 4^th or 5^thhand account of the original tale - and this is emphasised for some reason –and perhaps for important or understandable reasons? This dialogue is therefore a good illustration of how the Socratic-Platonic philosophic tradition was kept alive by an oral rather than purely written tradition.

Plato starts his dialogue as usual by giving the dramatic setting, and with Socrates refuting some of Zeno’s paradoxes (who is also present at the discussion) which he claims not to be paradoxes at all. Parmenides has said “the one [divine] exists” and gives a number of proofs – and Zeno has said that “the many does not exist”. According to Socrates, Zeno has taken the same view as Parmenides and merely expressed it the other way around and so his ideas are nothing new and not a paradox.

Parmenides congratulates young Socrates on his observations and then the experienced and respected philosopher advises him on how to develop his philosophical skills – and recommends certain practical “training”methods. Firstly he sensibly suggests (paragraph starting line 136a) that:

     ‘…if you wish to get better training (in philosophy and knowledge), you must do something more …. you must consider not only what happens if a particular hypothesis is true; but also what happens if it is not true.’

Parmenides then explains in more detail what he mean by this – and the various angles from which we should discuss a topic from. Socrates exclaims that this is a “stupendous amount of work” he is suggesting; but is it I wonder? Or is it just an hour or two today and another hour or two tomorrow and for a few days thereafter to examine any hypothesis in some detail and from all the various angles? Indeed, if we wish to suggest a hypothesis on anything serious, important or worthwhile ourselves, should we not – as trainee or “real” philosophers – be examining the implications of what we are saying from all angles as a pre-requisite. Would it not be better to say that we do not have an opinion on something if we have not carried out this work which Parmenides suggests is essential first?

Socrates then asks Parmenides to take a hypothesis of his own choice as an example and then discuss it from various angles to demonstrate what he means by this suggested method; to which Parmenides says: ‘….. this is a great task…. to impose on a man my age…. ‘. At line 136 E, Pythodorus tells Socrates:

      ‘If there were more of us, it would not be fair to ask it of him, for it is not suitable for him to speak on such subjects before many, especially at his age; for the many do not know for except by this devious passage through all things the mind cannot attain the truth.’

Parmenides agrees to Socrates’ request and suggests for an example hypothesis the supposition: ‘that the one exists…. or that it does not exist.’

[Suggestion for facilitators and group leaders – if you are studying this text with students – I think this is a good point to stop and first get the students to discuss the hypothesis themselves for an hour at least before reading further and seeing how Parmenides himself goes about it. You may even wish to leave the students to think about the above supposition for themselves for the rest of the morning/day…. and then perhaps make their own short presentations – before reading further with the text.]

At line 142.B Parmenides says:

     ‘Shall we then return to our hypothesis and see if a review of our argument discloses any new point of view?’

He then proceeds to summarise and develop his previous arguments in just a page or two. All nice and succinct and clear you might be thinking but I do not feel this to be the case. For example, Parmenides asks Socrates:

      ‘In this way: If being is predicated of the one which exists and unity is predicated of being which is one , and being and one are not the same, but belong to the existent one of our hypothesis , must not the existent one be a whole of which the one and being are parts?’

To which Socrates replies (almost amusingly in my own view): ‘Inevitably…’ Is Socrates joking? It seems like a rather complicated and bewildering statement for Socrates to give such a reply that he thought the statement obvious or inevitable. Perhaps the truth is they have both left me behind in terms of intellect or in terms of interest by this asking questions this way and then that – and then back the other way again. And I wonder, in truth – which is the subject of our discussion here, are they any closer to proving or deciding or knowing whether the divine is “One “ or “many” at the end of it all?

There then follows a discussion on the existence of the one and of ‘being’ itself. At line 160.B (P.311 Fowler) Parmenides in keeping with the training method he has earlier suggested to Socrates asks:

     ‘Well, and ought we not next to consider what must happens if one does not exist?’

For expediency with this blog I will quote here two paragraphs from the Wikipedia website:

      'This difficult second part of the dialogue is generally agreed to be one of the most challenging, and sometimes bizarre, pieces in the whole of the Platonic corpus. It consists of an unrelenting series of difficult and subtle arguments, where the exchange is stripped of all but the bare essentials of the arguments involved. Gone are the drama and colour we are accustomed to from [Plato’s] earlier dialogues.

      The long, austere second half of the dialogue is organised as a series of eight (or alternatively, nine deductions about the relation of the one to the many. The reasoning is often, as are Parmenides' arguments in the first section of the work, obscure, and at times appears to be blatantly fallacious. Further, the deductions appear to be set up in a way to deliberately produce antinomies, or mutually contradictory conclusions…..’

Wikipedia then list the main points covered in the rest of the dialogue at: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Parmenides_(dialogue).However, although perhaps convenient, this summary by Wikipedia may be an over simplification of the discussion in the second half of the dialogue. If you want to read a little deeper there is as usual a good longer essay on the Stanford University website at:http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/plato-parmenides 

“Bite Size” Summary:

As mentioned at the start of this blog while I enjoyed very much indeed the first 15 pages or so of this dialogue, I did find the latter pages rather hard going and dry: and as you must know by now I am usually a big fan of Plato’s writings on many fronts including the vivid myths, rich flowing language, humour and general readability. Below I give two opposing views on the dialogue by respected commentators: the first by H N Lamb who seems to sympathise with my own view (and that expressed above by Wikipedia) to some extent, and then secondly a quote from the 15^th Century Neoplatonist Marsilio Ficino who feels that in this dialogue Plato:

      ‘…surpasses even himself - to bring forth this work miraculously from the adytum of the divine mind and from the innermost sanctum of philosophy.’

Firstly Lamb writes:

      ‘There can be no doubt that Plato’s contemporaries, living in the atmosphere of philosophical discussion which pervaded the Athens of those days; understood many of the allusions in the text which are lost on us, and were able to appreciate Plato’s point of view more fully than any modern scholar can hope to do, but even for them the result of this dialogue must have been chiefly, if not entirely negative. In greater or lesser degree the same is true of several other dialogues which appear to belong to nearly the same date. Such are the Theaetetus, the Cratylus, the Sophist, the Statesman, and the Philibus. These all seem to be more or less polemical, and in most of them the interest in method is evident. ’

However, Marsilio Ficino says:

     ‘While Plato sprinkled the seeds of all wisdom throughout all his dialogues, yet he collected the precepts of moral philosophy in the books on the Republic, the whole of science in the Timaeus, and he comprehended the whole of theology in the Parmenides. And whereas in the other works he rises far above all other philosophers, in this one he seems to surpass even himself and to bring forth this work miraculously from the adytum of the divine mind and from the innermost sanctum of philosophy. Whosoever undertakes the reading of this sacred book shall first prepare himself in a sober mind and detached spirit, before he makes bold to tackle the mysteries of this heavenly work. For here Plato discusses his own thoughts most subtly: how the One itself is the principle of all things, which is above all things and from which all things are, and in what manner it is outside everything and in everything, and how everything is from it, through it, and toward it.’ (Klibansky, 1941)

Certainly Parmenides is not one of Plato’s easier texts, and people will delight or otherwise by reading it. As with all things I recommend making your own minds up and taking a couple of hours at least to have a look at that first 15 pages I mentioned above which I found interesting and worthwhile.

James (London - Jan 2013)